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INTRODUCTION 
In his interesting article, Inefficient Evidence,1 Professor Alex Stein 
defends a new approach to the question of how a legal system might 
undertake evidence sorting in determining whether a particular class or 
category of evidence should be declared inadmissible notwithstanding its 
relevancy. I have read Professor Stein’s article as an academic lawyer 
working on evidence law in England, with particular reference to criminal 
cases,2 and the following comments should be seen in that light. For 
example, my knowledge of U.S. evidence law, against the general 
background of which Stein sets his arguments, is considerably more limited 
than my knowledge of the law of evidence as it applies in criminal cases in 
England and Wales, on which knowledge I draw in the pages that follow. 
Borrowing from an approach “widely used in statistics, science, and 
engineering,”3 Stein argues that only evidence satisfying an adequate 
signal-to-noise (or SNR) ratio should be admitted for consideration by the 
fact finders. Thus, “‘signal’ refers to information reliable enough to allow 
the fact finders to determine the probability of the underlying allegation,” 
while “[i]nformation not allowing the fact finders to make a reliable 
determination of the relevant probability is ‘noise.’”4 Noisy evidence is 
 
*  Professor of Law, City University London; Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London. 
1.  Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423 (2015). 
2.  Writing in 1997, Twining accurately observed (William Twining, Freedom of Proof and the 
Reform of Criminal Evidence, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 439, 442 n.12 (1997)): “Most courses on the Law of 
Evidence in England concentrate very heavily on criminal evidence (there is not much civil evidence 
law left to teach) and increasingly the literature treats criminal and civil evidence separately.” 
3.  Stein, supra note 1, at 425. 
4.  Id. at 424–25. 
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probabilistically ambiguous.5 “When the noise mutes the signal, the 
information becomes inefficient and the court should not admit it into 
evidence.”6 What is crucial, under this approach, is the range of 
probabilities to which the particular evidence gives rise. If that range is 
short (or, in other words, the probabilities are clustered—for example, 
40%, 50%, and 60%), then the evidence will have a high SNR because the 
signal will be much greater than the noise. Information that gives 
rise to a clustered probability—high, low, or in-between—therefore 
always qualifies as good evidence. This information will help fact 
finders reach the right decision and will virtually never mislead 
them. Hence, it is efficient and courts should always admit it into 
evidence.7 
If, on the other hand, the range is wide (or, in other words, the probabilities 
are dispersed—for example, 10%, 50%, and 90%), then the relevant SNR 
will be low and, being inefficient, the evidence should be deemed 
inadmissible. 
I. RANGES OF PROBABILITIES 
Stein’s arguments, as I have described them thus far, are clearly novel 
and bring a fresh perspective to bear on fundamental questions of evidence 
doctrine. At the most basic level, Stein’s thesis serves as a reminder that a 
central concern of the law of evidence is with the approach that it should 
take to differing perceptions of the extent to which a particular piece of 
evidence might be considered to indicate the probability of the underlying 
allegation. Stein’s view is that, if such perceptions are sufficiently 
consistent, then the evidence should be admitted. The apparent simplicity 
of this seems to me to mask the reality that it is precisely the question of 
whether there is such consistency that will generate debate. How are we to 
determine whether the relevant range of probabilities is short rather than 
wide? Any attempt at probabilistic calculations (or estimations) in the 
context of evidence law is fraught with difficulty.8 For example, even such 
a basic concept as the relevancy of evidence—defined as its “tendency to 
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the 
 
5.  Id. at 432. 
6.  Id. at 425. 
7.  Id. at 426. 
8.  Note, however, that “[w]hen policymakers cannot determine the relevant probabilities even 
roughly, they should assume that these probabilities can be any. Evidence that gives rise to these 
indeterminable probabilities will consequently be identified as extremely noisy.” Id. at 436 n.41. 
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evidence”9—may generate controversy. Relevancy, the South African Law 
Reform Commission has explained, is ultimately “determined by each 
presiding officer’s common sense which is shaped by his or her own 
personal experience and therefore has the potential to be discriminatory.”10 
Perhaps, however, it is possible to overplay any criticism that Stein’s 
thesis does not point in the direction of clear or simple solutions. Even if 
his article does not go much further than reminding us, in a novel fashion, 
that it is because there is legitimate debate about ranges of probabilities that 
there is legitimate debate about whether particular rules of evidence are 
justified, then it will have performed a valuable function. 
II. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Stein’s article does, however, go further than that. It seeks to defend 
the need for a large legal system to 
macromanage evidence. American courts process millions of cases 
every year. This unparalleled volume of litigation makes it 
imperative for our system to minimize the total cost of errors and 
error-avoidance in fact-finding. To achieve this socially beneficial 
result, the system must get rid of inefficient evidence: one that 
increases the cost of fact-finding without significantly improving 
the accuracy of court decisions. The system therefore will do well 
to suppress all evidence that has a low SNR.11 
Thus, in the light of SNR analysis, “the law [should] make [rules of 
admissibility] in relation to categories of evidence instead of asking judges 
to carry out a cost–benefit analysis of individual items of evidence. The 
resulting saving of adjudicative expenses makes these [rules] efficient from 
an economic standpoint.”12 To illuminate this point, Stein contrasts a legal 
system with a caseload of one million cases a year (“System L”) with 
another, otherwise identical, system with a caseload of one-tenth of that 
number (“System S”). “Because System S’s caseload is relatively light, it 
can afford expending some of its resources on the integration of noisy 
evidence in adjudicative fact-finding,”13 although this system “may still 
 
9.  FED. R. EVID. 401(a). 
10.  S. AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, REVIEW OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (HEARSAY AND 
RELEVANCE) para. 3.28 (2008). See also, for discussions of the controversial questions surrounding the 
relevancy of sexual history evidence, Aileen McColgan, Common Law and the Relevance of Sexual 
History Evidence, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 275 (1996); Liat Levanon, Sexual History Evidence in 
Cases of Sexual Assault: A Critical Re-Evaluation, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 609 (2012). 
11.  Stein, supra note 1, at 428–29. 
12.  Id. at 428 (emphasis added). 
13.  Id. at 433. 
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find it economically necessary to set up [evidence-sorting] rules.”14 By 
contrast, the admission of noisy evidence “would drive System L into 
serious diseconomies of scale. To avoid these diseconomies, System L 
would do well to keep noisy evidence away from courts.”15 In such a 
system, it would not be cost-effective to allow the fact finders to evaluate a 
piece of evidence if the noise mutes the signal.16 “The more cases there are 
to process, the greater the system’s need to macromanage evidence in order 
to avoid diseconomies of scale. For a system that manages multiple trials, 
screening out inefficient evidence by applying the SNR principle is simply 
a plain economic necessity.”17 
A considerable part of Stein’s article is then devoted to demonstrating 
that this, indeed, is the approach that is generally taken in U.S. law. In other 
words, SNR analysis already “lies at the heart of our evidence system,”18 as 
“[t]olerating [inefficient] evidence would make our fact-finding system 
slow and ineffectual.”19 From the perspective of a non-expert on U.S. law, I 
find Stein’s illustrations illuminating, but I do not feel sufficiently qualified 
to comment on them in any detail here. However, they provide much food 
for thought for me as a lawyer in England and Wales, which has just under 
one-fifth of the population of the United States.20 Might England and Wales 
be a jurisdiction where there is—in contrast with the position in the United 
States—greater justification for micromanagement of evidence in the form 
of more reliance on “a cost–benefit analysis of individual items of 
evidence,”21 and correspondingly, less reliance on rules of admissibility 
governing categories of evidence? Is England and Wales closer, in this 
respect, to “System S” than to the United States? Certainly, a hallmark of 
the contemporary law of evidence in England and Wales, and in a number 
of other Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Canada, is decreasing 
reliance on categorical rules and the emergence of 
a principled approach that emphasizes consistency in the 
application of evidence law with its underlying policies. The 
principled approach entails a general preference for flexible 
 
14.  Id. at 435 n.40. 
15.  Id. at 434. 
16.  See id. at 436. 
17.  Id. at 442. 
18.  Id. at 435. 
19.  Id. at 443. 
20.  In 2013, 57 million (Population Estimates for UK, Mid-2013, OFFICE FOR NATIONAL 
STATISTICS, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pop-estimate/population-estimates-for-uk—england-and-
wales—scotland-and-northern-ireland/2013/index.html (last visited November 5, 2014)), in contrast to 
316 million (U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited November 5, 2014)). 
21.  Stein, supra note 1, at 428. 
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principles over strict rules. It requires evidence doctrines to be 
framed and applied in a way that is centered on the interests and 
values at stake in the evidence problem.22 
Professor Colin Tapper has noted, in a style remarkably similar to Stein’s, 
that “[t]he absence of clear rules for the judges to apply will tend to 
multiply and prolong arguments in favour of, or against, the use of 
particular pieces of evidence,”23 and that “[o]verall it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that principles are resorted to just because they exist at such a 
high level of generality that they can easily be agreed in advance, but at the 
expense of potential disagreement at the point of their application to 
particular situations.”24 Supporters of the principled approach, however, are 
prepared to accept any increased “inefficiency” that might accompany it in 
return for its perceived benefits: “If the principled approach prevents 
judges from thoughtlessly applying rules they do not understand, that is a 
good outcome, even if it comes at some cost in terms of predictability and 
procedural efficiency.”25 
Certainly, there are regular indications in England and Wales of 
ambivalence, if not outright hostility, towards evidentiary rules regarded as 
unduly complex or technical.26 Indeed, rules of admissibility have tended to 
become increasingly flexible and open-textured, an example being those 
governing the admissibility of evidence of bad character in criminal cases, 
contained in particular provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.27 At the 
foundation of these rules is the loose definition of evidence of bad 
 
22.  Lisa Dufraimont, Realizing the Potential of the Principled Approach to Evidence, 39 
QUEEN’S L.J. 11, 13 (2013). 
23.  Colin Tapper, The Law of Evidence and the Rule of Law, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 69 (2009). 
24.  Id. at 73. 
25.  Dufraimont, supra note 22, at 27. 
26.  For example, writing extrajudicially, Lord Justice Auld described the provisions of the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 prescribing special measures for vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses as “extraordinarily complicated and prescriptive. I can only assume that those drafting them 
have no idea of what judges and criminal practitioners have to cope with in their daily work of 
preparing for and conducting a criminal trial or of what they need as practical working tools for the job. 
Simple and more flexible rules . . . are what are needed . . . .” LORD JUSTICE AULD, REVIEW OF THE 
CRIMINAL COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES, ch. 11 para. 126 (2001). Another example may be 
provided by the interpretation of section 41 of the same Act, which governs the admissibility of sexual 
history evidence. This provision contains the relevant test for the admissibility of sexual history 
evidence, setting out four specific situations in which leave to introduce such evidence may be granted. 
Yet the House of Lords in R v. A., [2001] UKHL 25, not uncontroversially, invoked section 3 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, which requires legislation to be interpreted compatibly with the European 
Convention on Human Rights if possible, to hold—in effect—that section 41 could be interpreted 
flexibly if this was necessary to guarantee the defendant a fair trial under article 6 of the Convention. 
The consequence of this decision is that sexual history evidence will be admissible if its admissibility is 
considered necessary to ensure a fair trial, even if, on a literal reading, the test for admissibility 
articulated in the relevant legislation is not satisfied. The dislike of any strictures that are considered 
unduly prescriptive is again apparent. 
27.  See generally MIKE REDMAYNE, CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2015). 
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character as, in essence, “evidence of, or of a disposition towards, 
misconduct . . . , other than evidence which . . . has to do with the alleged 
facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged,”28 with 
“misconduct,” in turn, being defined loosely as “the commission of an 
offence or other reprehensible behaviour.”29 
Open-texturedness of concepts and rules does not, however, necessarily 
imply arbitrariness. This is well illustrated by the rules governing the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal cases, which are also 
contained in provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003.30 The traditional 
approach of treating hearsay evidence as inadmissible, subject to 
exceptions, has been maintained, although the available exceptions are now 
more flexible, and significantly, there is—for the first time in England and 
Wales—an exception analogous to the “residual exception” contained in 
rule 807 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence. This exception, contained 
in section 114(1)(d) of the Act of 2003, allows hearsay evidence to be 
admitted if “the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for [the 
evidence] to be admissible.”31 Section 114(2) further provides that, in 
deciding whether a hearsay statement should be admitted in evidence “in 
the interests of justice” under section 114(1)(d), 
the court must have regard to the following factors (and to any 
others it considers relevant)— 
(a) how much probative value the statement has (assuming it to be 
true) in relation to a matter in issue in the proceedings, or how 
valuable it is for the understanding of other evidence in the case; 
(b) what other evidence has been, or can be, given on the matter or 
evidence mentioned in paragraph (a); 
(c) how important the matter or evidence mentioned in paragraph 
(a) is in the context of the case as a whole; 
(d) the circumstances in which the statement was made; 
(e) how reliable the maker of the statement appears to be; 
(f) how reliable the evidence of the making of the statement 
appears to be; 
(g) whether oral evidence of the matter stated can be given and, if 
not, why it cannot; 
(h) the amount of difficulty involved in challenging the statement; 
 
28.  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 98. 
29.  Id. at § 112. 
30.  See generally Andrew L.-T. Choo, Criminal Hearsay in England and Wales: Pragmatism, 
Comparativism, and Human Rights, 17 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 227 (2013); J.R. SPENCER, HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2d ed. 2014). 
31.  Criminal Justice Act § 114(1)(d). 
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(i) the extent to which that difficulty would be likely to prejudice 
the party facing it.32 
This is a very detailed collection of—mandatory—factors. Moreover, the 
Court of Appeal has been careful to emphasize that section 114(1)(d) 
should not be resorted to lightly33 and should not, in particular, be utilized 
to undermine the principle that first-hand evidence is to be preferred to 
hearsay evidence: 
Both the interests of justice test and section 114(2)(g) command 
attention to the question whether oral evidence can be given, rather 
than reliance be placed on the hearsay statement. We would expect 
that before reaching the conclusion that it is in the interests of 
justice to admit a hearsay statement, the Judge must very carefully 
consider the alternatives. The alternatives may well include the 
bringing of an available, but reluctant, witness to court. It by no 
means follows in practice that [such] a witness . . . will in fact 
refuse to give evidence if brought to court. If he may do so, then 
consideration will also need to be given to whether justice would 
better be served by putting him before the jury so that they can see 
him, with the possibility of applying to cross-examine him upon 
the previous statement, rather than simply putting in that statement 
for evaluation in the abstract by the jury.34 
Again, in R v. T.,35 the Court of Appeal demonstrated its preparedness to 
subject issues raised by section 114(1)(d) to rigorous scrutiny. In a trial for 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm, evidence of the complainant’s 
witness statements and of a recording of her emergency telephone call to 
the police was admitted under section 114(1)(d). The Court of Appeal held 
that the evidence had been incorrectly admitted, criticizing in particular the 
trial judge’s treatment of sections 114(2)(c) and 114(2)(g): 
In our judgment, this is a case . . . in which the live evidence of the 
complainant could have been available at the trial . . . . [I]f 
reasonable steps had been taken, she could in all probability have 
been located and a witness summons issued and served. There was 
no reason to believe that the complainant would not have complied 
with a witness summons. 
 
32.  Id. at § 114(2). 
33.  See R v. D., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1213, [17]; R v. Z., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 20, [20]; R v. 
Y., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 10, [62]; Sak v. Crown Prosecution Serv., [2007] EWHC (Admin) 2886, [20]. 
34.  R v. Y., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 10, [60]. 
35.  [2011] EWCA (Crim) 2341. 
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 Thus the important factor set out in section 114(2)(g) should 
have led to the response that the oral evidence of the complainant 
could have been given, and if it was unavailable that was through 
the failure of the prosecution to take reasonable steps to secure the 
attendance of the complainant. 
 . . . . 
 . . . There was no evidence that the complainant could not be 
traced: the implication of the finding that no reasonable steps had 
been taken to trace her was that she could have been traced. In 
stating that she would in any event have refused to give evidence 
through fear of the appellant the judge was speculating . . . . 
 It was also necessary for the judge to consider paragraph (c) of 
section 114(2). The evidence in question could not have been more 
important in the context of the case as a whole. Without it the 
prosecution could not continue. It was virtually the entirety of the 
prosecution case. Only in rare circumstances, if any, can it be right 
to allow evidence of this importance to be adduced when there has 
been a failure to take reasonable steps to secure the attendance of 
the witness. There was no justification for it to be admitted in the 
present case. 
 . . . . 
 In our judgment, the judge failed to place proper weight on the 
matter listed in section 114(2)(c) and his consideration of the factor 
in paragraph (g) was flawed.36 
Thus, the vagueness of the concept of the “interests of justice” 
notwithstanding, a certain robustness in the application of the test—the 
courts being assisted here by the detailed mandatory criteria articulated in 
section 114(2)—is evident in the case law. 
The English courts’ dislike of the perceived inflexibility of bright-line 
tests is illustrated by the approach taken to the interpretation of article 
6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is effectively 
“incorporated” into the domestic law of the United Kingdom by the Human 
Rights Act 1998. Article 6(3)(d), which—crudely—may be considered the 
European equivalent of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, 
guarantees a person charged with a criminal offence the right “to examine 
or have examined witnesses against him.”37 It will be well known to U.S. 
evidence scholars that the bright-line test for the interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. 
 
36.  Id. at [12]–[13], [15], [16], [18]. 
37.  European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(3)(d), Nov. 4, 
1950, E.T.S. No. 5. 
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Washington was motivated by a rejection of the idea of contextual 
determinations of reliability: 
Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept. 
There are countless factors bearing on whether a statement is 
reliable . . . . Whether a statement is deemed reliable depends 
heavily on which factors the judge considers and how much weight 
he accords each of them. Some courts wind up attaching the same 
significance to opposite facts.38 
By contrast, in England and Wales, a different approach is taken. In 
essence, while there is a very strong presumption that article 6(3)(d) will be 
violated by the admission in evidence of a hearsay statement that 
constitutes the sole or decisive evidence against the defendant, this 
presumption can be dislodged by the existence of sufficient 
counterbalancing measures, in particular measures that allow the reliability 
of the evidence to be properly assessed, with the court ultimately having to 
be satisfied that the evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.39 
In sum, a legal system’s rejection of a primarily categorical approach to 
evidence sorting does not imply that SNR analysis is not undertaken at any 
stage at all. What it means is that—possibly at the cost of efficiency, or 
possibly not40—courts are required to assume greater responsibility for 
performing cost–benefit analyses of evidence in individualized contexts. 
Evidence sorting becomes increasingly a matter for the courts rather than 
being a matter to be pre-determined strictly by the law of evidence. 
Traditional macromanagement of evidence is downplayed in favour of 
increased micromanagement. In undertaking such micromanagement 
responsibilities, courts might well find that SNR analysis proves to be a 
useful tool to deploy. 
III. “FREE PROOF” 
“Free proof” is not a term of art, but is generally used to signify “the 
freedom of adjudicators (and others involved in reasoning about questions 
of fact) from technical or artificial constraints on the use of ordinary 
 
38.  541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004). 
39.  “The task of the court is to be sure that there are sufficient counterbalancing measures in 
place (including measures that permit a proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence fairly to 
take place) and to permit a conviction to be based on it only if it is sufficiently reliable given its 
importance in the case.” R v. Riat, [2012] EWCA (Crim) 1509, [86]; see also R v. Horncastle, [2009] 
UKSC 14; Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2127. 
40.  Might grappling with complex rules of evidence actually decrease efficiency in some 
instances? Or, at least, might any efficiency gains be neutralized? 
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practical reason in argumentation.”41 The concept of free proof therefore 
reflects “the principle that all evidence should be admitted in an 
indiscriminate fashion and assessed for weight later at the point of 
deliberation”;42 the essence of the concept is the free admissibility of 
evidence for consideration by the fact finders. In his article, Stein notes that 
“[m]any scholars” have advocated the adoption of a regime of free proof, 
with such scholars “argu[ing] that sorting evidence into ‘reliable’ and 
‘unreliable’ categories is futile, as evidence ought to be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis rather than categorically.”43 This observation is true as 
far as it goes: in a system that embraces free proof, all evidence-sorting 
rules that pre-determine the admissibility of particular categories of 
evidence—apart from any such rules as may be considered to have the 
determination of relevancy as their rationale—are clearly redundant. The 
important point to note, however, is that rejection by a legal system of the a 
priori categorization of evidence for admissibility purposes does not 
necessarily imply its acceptance or adoption of the concept of free proof. 
Any perception that a priori evidence-sorting rules are “futile” may be 
attributable simply to the view that such rules do not work well and that it 
is therefore much more effective to leave evidence sorting to courts to 
undertake in the context of particular cases. It would be very possible in 
theory—and indeed in practice—for a particular legal system to reject 
firmly both categorical evidence-sorting rules as well as the concept of free 
proof, relying on rigorous evidence sorting by its courts to prevent 
evidence from reaching the fact finders too readily. Freedom for fact 
finders in evaluating evidence, and freedom for courts from technical 
constraints in determining its admissibility in the first place, are not the 
same and should not be conflated. 
Of particular interest to me, for obvious reasons, is Stein’s further 
suggestion that free proof, or at least something approaching it, has become 
a hallmark of the legal system of England and Wales: “England—the 
birthland of evidence sorting rules—did away with most of them and 
effectively allows fact finders to engage in a free evaluation of evidence.”44 
This comes across to me as somewhat overstated. It is true, as seen in the 
preceding section, that the importance of evidence-sorting rules has 
progressively diminished in criminal trials in England and Wales, but it 
may be more difficult to accept that most of them have now disappeared. It 
is also true that, in recent times, criminal trials in England and Wales have 
 
41.  Twining, supra note 2, at 452. 
42.  Peter Murphy, No Free Lunch, No Free Proof: The Indiscriminate Admission of Evidence Is 
a Serious Flaw in International Criminal Trials, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 539, 551–52 (2010). 
43.  Stein, supra note 1, at 440. 
44.  Id. at 440–41. 
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seen a movement away from the technique of limiting the access of fact 
finders to evidence by excluding it and towards a reliance on educating fact 
finders by giving them cautionary instructions or warnings about evidence 
that they have heard.45 There is a 
general principle . . . that a “special warning” is necessary if 
experience, research or common sense has indicated that there is a 
difficulty with a certain type of evidence that requires giving the 
jury a warning of its dangers and the need for caution, tailored to 
meet the needs of the case. This will often be the case where jurors 
may be unaware of the difficulty, or may insufficiently understand 
it. 
 The strength of the warning and its terms will depend on the 
nature of the evidence, its reliability or lack of it, and the potential 
problems it poses. For instance, it has been recognised that 
identification of a suspect by voice is less reliable than visual 
identification evidence, and accordingly usually requires a warning 
that is couched in stronger terms . . . .46 
An excellent example of diametrically opposed approaches to a 
specific evidentiary problem is provided by the treatment of evidence of 
“the defendant’s accomplice who testifies against the defendant.”47 Stein 
notes that there is, in “[m]ost states (but not the federal system)”48 in the 
United States, “an important rule of criminal procedure”49 consisting of a 
requirement that such evidence be corroborated as a pre-condition to its 
admissibility. According to Stein, 
[t]he reason for having this requirement must by now be clear. An 
accomplice to the alleged crime is a well-informed insider who 
knows most of the crime’s details, if not all of them. This 
knowledge enables the accomplice to develop a false, but entirely 
believable, self-serving account of the relevant events, which the 
defendant will find difficult to refute. For that reason, 
uncorroborated testimony of the defendant’s accomplice can have 
any probability between [0% and 100%] . . . . [A]ny such 
testimony has an impermissibly low SNR, which makes it 
 
45.  See generally Tapper, supra  note 23; ANDREW L.-T. CHOO, EVIDENCE 16 (3d ed. 2012). The 
terminology is borrowed from Lisa Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules 
Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions? , 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 261, 280 (2008). 
46.  R v. Luttrell, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1344, [42], [43]. 
47.  Stein, supra note 1, at 453. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. 
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inefficient. This inefficiency can only be remedied by 
corroborative evidence that the law generally requires.50 
The rationale for the requirement, Stein emphasizes, is not the fact 
finders’ potential inability to assess the reliability of the accomplice’s 
testimony, but rather considerations of efficiency: “Those witnesses would 
not mislead fact finders on many occasions, as fact finders would tend not 
to believe them. Those witnesses, however, would nearly always waste the 
fact finders’ time and effort when the party who calls them does not offer 
corroborative evidence.”51 
In England and Wales precisely the same concerns raised by 
accomplice evidence are recognized, but the response to these concerns is 
entirely different. Immediately prior to the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994, a trial judge was obliged to issue a warning to the jury 
about convicting the defendant on the uncorroborated evidence of an 
alleged accomplice of the defendant testifying for the prosecution. It is 
important to note that this did not constitute a corroboration requirement, 
being simply a mandatory warning requirement. Even this warning 
requirement was then abolished by section 32(1) of the abovementioned 
Act of 1994 with these words: “Any requirement whereby at a trial on 
indictment it is obligatory for the court to give the jury a warning about 
convicting the accused on the uncorroborated evidence of a person merely 
because that person is . . . an alleged accomplice of the accused . . . is 
hereby abrogated.”52 Consequently, there being no longer any requirement 
to warn, such an accomplice may simply be the subject of a warning given 
in the exercise of judicial discretion. In the words of the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales: 
Whether, as a matter of discretion, a judge should give any warning 
and if so its strength and terms must depend upon the content and 
manner of the witness’s evidence, the circumstances of the case 
and the issues raised. The judge will often consider that no special 
warning is required at all. Where, however the witness has been 
shown to be unreliable, he or she may consider it necessary to urge 
caution. In a more extreme case, if the witness is shown to have 
lied . . . or to bear the defendant some grudge, a stronger warning 
may be thought appropriate and the judge may suggest it would be 
wise to look for some supporting material before acting on the 
impugned witness’s evidence . . . . We . . . stress that judges are not 
 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. at 454–55. 
52.  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, § 32(1). 
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required to conform to any formula and [the Court of Appeal] 
would be slow to interfere with the exercise of discretion by a trial 
judge who has the advantage of assessing the manner of a witness’s 
evidence as well as its content.53 
Despite, however, the growing reliance in England and Wales on 
warnings to fact finders about admitted evidence, it would be far from true 
to assert that all relevant evidence is now generally admissible and 
available for evaluation by the fact finders (subject to their taking into 
account any warnings that they may have been given). As the examples 
provided in the previous section demonstrated, the courts in England and 
Wales appear generally to be well aware of the need to prevent evidence 
from getting to fact finders too readily. Proof in England and Wales may be 
somewhat “freer” than was once the case, and is probably considerably 
freer than proof in the United States, but it is a long way from being 
essentially free. 
CONCLUSION 
I have endeavoured here to provide some broad reactions to, rather than 
a fully developed commentary on, Stein’s article. Stein’s thesis is thought-
provoking and his article offers valuable perspectives on some of the 
general issues raised by particular categories of evidence. SNR analysis is a 
useful device, so long as one does not expect straightforward answers to 
follow from it. Further, while it does not purport to be a comparative piece, 
Stein’s article indirectly challenges those functioning in smaller 
jurisdictions where contextual determinations of admissibility take place 
alongside traditional-style rule-driven ones, such as myself, to assess 
whether their own legal systems might do well to strive for (a return to) 
greater “efficiency.” “Free proof,” however, is a red herring. Stein appears 
to conflate the issue of different styles of determining admissibility, which 
he regards as relevant to the level of efficiency of the legal system, with 
the—analytically distinct—issue of freedom of proof. As such, the brief 
references to free proof in his article might have been developed more 
thoroughly and convincingly, or alternatively—as they have no discernible 
relevancy to his general thesis—omitted altogether. The force of Stein’s 
central thesis does not appear dependent on, and may actually be 
undermined by, his references to free proof. 
 
 
53.  R v. Makanjuola, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1348, 1351. 
